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Union revitalization, coalition building and the high road 
Labor-community coalitions are not a new concept.  Unions approach such coalitions now, as in 
the past, as one way to enhance their bargaining power with an employer. Such coalitions are 
temporary and often issue-based.  In recent years, however, some local labor movements have 
begun to look at coalitions in a broader way – as a means of improving their public image and 
building power in the political arena.  This broad-based approach requires the development of 
coalitions for the longer run, not just for temporary expediency.  This paper develops the notion 
of a high road social infrastructure as a way to understand how union leaders develop and sustain 
coalitions over time and find the resources they need to succeed in shaping economic 
development priorities for the region.   
We define the “high road” in terms of a path of economic development that provides a 
high level of worker rights, skill investment, wages and benefits.  Ideally, high-road businesses 
thrive by producing high-quality products and services.  In exchange for high productivity and a 
commitment to innovation, employers have to pay high wages, provide good benefits and invest 
in training.  The low road, by contrast, is a pattern of employer behavior that seeks 
competitiveness by lowering wages and shifting costs and risks onto workers.  Because 
businesses do not usually pursue high road strategies their own, unions and public policy have to 
establish a framework of rules and organizational structures to regulate economic development in 
a way that closes off the low road and builds the high road.   
Case study evidence suggests that union efforts to promote high road regional economic 
development are widespread in the global north.  David Reynolds, for example, draws on the 
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European experience to make sense of labor’s high-road projects in U.S. urban regions (2002).  
Bruce Nissen (2004) takes the concept further in his discussion of the politics of coalition 
building, with an argument that unions should establish independent structures to carry out local 
high-road projects that, to some extent, allow the community to take the lead.  Others have 
discussed central labor councils (Ness and Eimer 2001) and labor educators (Fricke and 
Totterdill 2004) as advocates of the high road.  These studies emphasize the importance of 
organization building outside the structures of local unions as helpful in using coalitions to shape 
economic development.   
Individual unionists acting as political entrepreneurs play a central role in most stories of 
coalition building.  Fred Rose (2000) calls the leaders that stitch together coalitions “bridge-
builders.”  These leaders are comfortable in activist situations outside of the union’s 
organizational boundaries and, in many cases, have personal histories in other social movements.  
Coalition work does not require a “natural” community of interest; instead, it requires that 
leaders reframe issues and strengthen their personal relationships with activists in other social 
movements, in order to build coalitions across class lines.  This process depends on the “strategic 
choice” of union leaders (see Turner’s introduction to this volume). 
Union leaders, however, tend to move on, and coalitions are too often only temporary.  
Typically, the shared work of social action in committees or joint campaigns is the glue that 
holds coalitions together, and thus these coalitions survive only as long as all sides perceive the 
need to work together on concrete on-going issues.  Labor’s lasting contribution to a region, 
however, can be sustainable when coalition work becomes institutionalized – a matter of 
“business as usual.”  This is more likely to occur when unions and their partners set up 
organizations with paid staff to develop and administer projects to coordinate the shared work.  
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Such semi-autonomous organizations work outside the structure of unions and can therefore 
carry out projects that would be impossible if a single union were in charge.  The common work 
of steering the organization through a governing board and carrying out the organization’s 
ongoing projects provides the glue the keeps labor together with its community allies. 
Institutionalizing coalition activity is important, because it creates a basis for further 
work, through what Lowell Turner calls “spillovers” (2004).  Observers of social movements 
have shown that campaigns, revolutions and other popular mobilizations occur in causally 
connected sequences (Tarrow, McAdam and Tilly 2001).  For example, the 1999 protests in 
Seattle against the World Trade Organization brought activists together in new ways, who then 
organized a series of international demonstrations and domestic campaigns in the following few 
years.  In local politics, different events or campaigns are likewise interrelated.  Individual 
protests or campaigns can have spillovers on their own; but organizations, with full-time staff 
managing projects, carrying out research, writing grants, lobbying and maintaining community 
ties, can create spillovers over a long period by launching projects and carrying out long-term 
relationship-building.  This cycle of organization building and spillovers, catalyzed by individual 
union leaders, is the process through which high-road social infrastructures emerge. 
Can sustained coalitions save the labor movement?  Can they overcome well-known 
problems of uninspiring leadership, lack of concern for new organizing and blindness to broad 
community concerns?  The literature on union revitalization has documented exceptions to the 
rule, where unions have reoriented themselves around organizing (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Voss 
and Sherman 2000; Bronfenbrenner, Friedman, Hurd, Oswald and Seeber 1998) or broad 
community concerns (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004; Milkman 2002).  Although these studies 
pose the problem well, they have either lacked a normative dimension (revitalization for what?) 
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or treated coalitions as part of the intuitively powerful, but hard-to-define, phenomenon of 
revitalization.  We find unions building infrastructures to engage with the economic development 
problems of their regions, in a way, however, that does not address the problem of declining 
membership. 
The rest of this paper will examine this process in two very different cities: Seattle, 
Washington and Buffalo, New York.  Seattle is an affluent, politically progressive city struggling 
with the contradictions of growth; Buffalo is a politically paralyzed city facing 
deindustrialization and population decline.  Barriers to success, such as a past of labor-
community conflict, a one-sided pro-business orientation in local government and the problems 
of racial segregation and deindustrialization, exist in both cities.  Nevertheless, unionists, with an 
eye to coalitions and organization building, have reframed these barriers as problems to be 
solved.  Drawing on cases from our earlier work (Greer and Fleron 2005; Byrd and Greer 2005), 
we conclude by discussing the parallels of infrastructure building in the two cities.  The Seattle-
Buffalo comparison shows that infrastructure building can work as a response to very different 
economic development challenges in very different political contexts. 
 
Seattle 
Seattle is a growing urban region with major concentrations of aerospace, transportation and 
research-related jobs.  The metropolitan area has added about 200,000 jobs during the past 10 
years, mainly in service and transportation industries, spurring an explosion in non-union work.  
The University of Washington, the Port of Seattle, Boeing and Microsoft have been the central 
hubs of economic activity, serving as employers and attracting other firms.  The largest unions 
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are the building trades, teamsters, Boeing unions (IAM and SPEEA), public sector unions (NEA, 
AFSME, SEIU and IFPTE), construction and service unions (SEIU, UFCW and UNITE HERE).  
In recent years, new locals have emerged to organize the growing precarious workforce, 
including graduate employees (UAW), homecare workers (SEIU) and technology workers 
(CWA-WashTech).   
 Although the economy as a whole has grown substantially in recent years, manufacturing 
industries – especially waterfront-oriented industries like shipbuilding – have struggled.  In many 
of the growing industries, temporary, part-time and low wage work has replaced unionized full-
time middle-income jobs.  The challenge for unions has been primarily to retain “good” jobs and 
to organize the new work that employers have created.  They have been doing so primarily 
through a revitalized central labor council, the King County Labor Council (KCLC), which has 
engaged in coalitions around immediate union fights (initially via Jobs with Justice and 
eventually via its own internal Union Cities program), around economic development policy (via 
the Worker Center), around global justice issues (via the WTO protests and subsequent fair trade 
efforts) and around local elections (in coalition with environmental and other groups).  Although 
the effect on union density has been modest at best, the effect on politics and policymaking has 
been dramatic (Byrd and Greer 2005). 
 Seattle is historically an AFL town, with both strong conservative and progressive 
currents.  Old AFL unions continue their predominance in service, construction, transport and 
manufacturing industries.  Progressivism stretches back to the Seattle Central Labor Council of 
the early 20th century, which operated a daily newspaper and organized the 1919 general strike.  
Despite heroic moments, the events played into the hands of a right-wing populist mayor and left 
the labor movement deeply divided between progressivism and a rising tide of business 
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unionism.  During the 1920’s, Seattle native Dave Beck began to organize workers in transport 
and related sectors into Teamsters locals throughout the west, using control over deliveries to 
win recognition.  Beck formed close ties to the business community to “stabilize” sectors where 
union members worked and distributed the proceeds of the local monopolies as higher wages.  
Conservatism continued to dominate through the civil rights era, as AFL-CIO leaders joined the 
building trades to resist demands for racial equality in hiring (from the community, from federal 
judges and from the Republican governor and county executive).   
 The waves of union defeats and plant closures of the 1970s and 1980s, however, created 
political will for change.  Slowly, non-profits, organizing around environmental and civil rights 
issues emerged, engaging unions as adversaries or setting up worker organizations outside the 
unions.  In 1993, Ron Judd assumed leadership of the KCLC.  Having served as an organizer for 
the local electricians union (IBEW Local 46) and then head of the building trades, Judd already 
had experience dealing with difficult issues through coalitions.  At Local 46, for example, he had 
worked with environmentalists to halt a major nonunion factory construction project.   
As head of the building trades, Judd worked to heal relations with the minority 
community and participate in economic development using the mechanism of the Project Labor 
Agreement (PLA).  By building a coalition involving owners of projects, community groups and 
unions, supported over time by the KCLC, he began to engage the minority community – mainly 
blacks, Asians and pacific islanders – in issues of job access.  With support from the Port of 
Seattle, a long process began, in which the building trades council built cooperation between 
community groups, craft unions, governments and employers to desegregate the trades.  Public 
owners of projects, like the Port and the City of Seattle found that the new regulations – built 
into the PLA – allowed them to connect public works to raising purchasing power in low-income 
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neighborhoods.  The hiring rules in the PLA provided employment opportunities for unionized 
workers, shut out contractors without apprentices, while making exceptions for non-union 
minority contractors (and, they claimed, to organize these contractors).  By the early 2000’s, 
Project Labor Agreements requiring minimum levels of apprenticeship labor and setting targets 
for female and minority hiring were common on large public and private projects.  The same 
activists who had sued the building trades in the 1970s over discrimination were now working 
with the trades to enforce apprenticeship and diversity standards. 
Within a year of joining the KCLC, Judd personally took part in a series of high-profile 
actions in conjunction with Jobs with Justice.  In May 1993, Judd led a demonstration at the local 
NLRB office against the board’s ineffectiveness in enforcing labor law, in which he was 
arrested.  Soon thereafter, the council threw its weight behind a contract battle at Alaska Airlines 
using CHAOS (Create Havoc in Our System) sickouts, which resulted in the arrests of 25 
activists at the firm’s Seattle headquarters.  The council’s attention then turned to US Senator 
Slade Gorton, who supported legislation making it easier for companies to replace striking 
workers permanently.  One hundred activists, including several “permanently replaced” flight 
attendants, disrupted the opening ceremony of his new local office.  In March 1994, the council 
cemented its reputation by organizing 200 activists to invade a business-sponsored celebration of 
NAFTA.  Jobs with Justice and KCLC continued this pattern of “street heat” throughout the 
1990s, by supporting a pair of enormous strikes at Boeing, a musicians’ strike and the WTO 
protests (Rosenblum, 2001).   
Judd also incorporated the Worker Center (WC) into the KCLC, which came to serve a 
lobbying and policy development function.  The WC had been organized in 1986 by a coalition 
of labor, religious and other community groups to fight plant closures and layoffs in the wood 
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products and shipbuilding industries.  Judd saw it as a vehicle for policy development and 
research on issues of economic and workforce development.  Promoting a vision for giving 
economically disadvantaged workers increased opportunities in the unionized sector, Judd won 
support from existing WC funders and the national AFL-CIO.  With the building trades, the WC 
has helped to develop apprenticeship utilization and project labor agreements at the Port of 
Seattle and elsewhere.  More recently, the WC helped a coalition of port unions respond to the 
port’s threat to end a decades-long policy of multi-employer collective bargaining covering 900 
HERE members.  The WC produced a study arguing for an employment policy for the 6,740 
employees of subcontracted service providers at the airport, including expedited organizing 
campaigns, job security, stable contracting relations, wage minimums, training and career 
ladders.  The port eventually agreed to retain collective bargaining.  Clean energy has also been 
on the WC’s agenda, and it has supported Washington State’s Apollo Alliance, a coalition of 
unions and environmental organizations to promote job-friendly ecological energy policies.   
 Perhaps the high point of the Judd years came with the 1999 World Trade Organization 
(WTO) protests, conducted by a massive coalition dealing with much bigger issues than the 
previous campaigns (Levi and Olson 2000).  The coalition included the full spectrum of 
organizations critical of the one-sided business orientation of the world’s trade regime.  Rather 
than taking on a specific employer, politician or public agency, these protests targeted the WTO 
as a symbol and agent of globalization.  The KCLC’s decision to push for massive labor 
involvement in the protests grew out of on-going concern of the WC and the KCLC about the 
impact of international trade on jobs and working conditions in the highly trade dependent 
Seattle area.  In a strategic move that won practical assistance as well as credibility from the 
national labor movement, Judd convinced AFL-CIO leadership in Washington, DC to commit 
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substantial staff and financial resources to the effort.  To do so, he had to convince the AFL-CIO 
that the community coalition itself was a legitimate organization in Seattle and worth supporting, 
even though at times labor would have to bend to the will of the larger group.  
 The opportunity to work with other organizations in preparing for the protest was seen 
by Judd and others as a way to solidify pre-existing coalition-building activities.  Beginning in 
early summer of 1999, meetings of interested organizations took place at the KCLC’s 
headquarters building.  The Direct Action Network, the Ruckus Society, the Sierra Club, the 
Citizen’s Trade Campaign, the Labor and Employment Law Office (LELO) and the Church 
Council of Greater Seattle all worked together in the months leading up to the meeting.  They 
honed the message and organized the logistics for a 50,000-person demonstration, which 
eventually turned out almost 100,000 demonstrators from the Western U.S. and Canada.   
Despite disagreements over tactics, the anti-WTO coalition made a lasting difference for 
the KCLC.  The planning and the tension-filled week of the protests created durable and long-
lasting personal relationships between labor activists and their partners.  Involvement in the 
WTO led the KCLC, for example, to support Jubilee 2000, as a way to deepen ties with activist 
leaders from the faith community and their congregations.  It set the stage for a future blue-green 
political effort at the Port of Seattle.  The KCLC’s involvement also strengthened its ability to do 
internal education, to educate its affiliates on trade issues, to mobilize large numbers of activists, 
and to build leadership skills among its staff.   
 After Judd’s departure, Steve Williamson became the KCLC’s leader; Williamson 
refocused the council’s coalition activities around political campaigns.  Williamson had been an 
organizer for SEIU and the Teamsters prior to becoming active in the KCLC during the WTO 
protests.  Although the labor council had been politically active during the 1990s, and supported 
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such initiatives as the 1998 statewide minimum wage increase, Williamson refined the council’s 
candidate endorsement and member mobilization practices to involve more members.  He hired a 
political director, first from the Nevada AFL-CIO, then from Washington Conservation Voters.  
The KCLC’s new approach, developed together with the state labor council, emphasized more 
systematic member mobilization for voter turnout, targeting of union members in canvassing, 
alliances with environmental groups in political campaigns and more accountability for endorsed 
candidates. 
 The KCLC first tried out the new political strategy in the Port Commission and mayoral 
races of 2001.  Tensions between labor and the Port had become apparent over organizing rights 
and outsourcing fights.  At the same time, environmental groups were coming into conflict with 
the Port over its construction practices.  As a labor-management partnership unraveled, the Port 
Commission began to oppose labor’s initiatives on a regular basis.  The KCLC responded by 
targeting normally uncontested port commissioner races.  Using a new approach designed to 
develop a consensus of affiliates, KCLC held candidate interviews with rank and file union 
members, who unanimously rejected the incumbents.  Lawrence Molloy from Washington 
Conservation Voters won labor’s support with his advocacy of a new airport runway as part of 
his sustainability platform.  Molloy won the KCLC endorsement and, with the support of unions 
and environmentalists, beat his opponent by a narrow margin.  Molloy became the first reliable 
labor vote on the Commission, and the KCLC’s support for him reinvigorated labor’s ties with 
the environmental community.  In 2003 the council repeated this performance, electing Alec 
Fisken. In 2005, in an effort to win a third seat on the Commission and therefore exercise a 
majority, the president of the Building Trades Council, Peter Coates, sought one of three open 
slots.  Unfortunately, Coates was eliminated in the primary, demonstrating that political progress 
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may be two steps forward, one step back.   
The 2001 mayor’s race was a clear victory for KCLC and its allies.  In the primary, the 
council endorsed challenger Greg Nickels for mayor over incumbent Paul Schell and City 
Attorney Mark Sidran.  This endorsement lacked the consensus within the house of labor that 
had characterized the Port Commission race, since unions of city workers had good relations 
with Schell.  After Schell lost in the primary, leaders of these unions viewed Sidran as more 
likely to carry on Schell’s cooperative labor relations approach.  Other KCLC affiliates opposed 
Sidran, who as City Attorney had carried out prosecutions of anti-WTO protestors and had 
allegedly ignored claims of unfair treatment by women workers in the City Attorney’s office.  
The KCLC thus threw its muscle into the race behind Nickels, who won the runoff election by a 
razor-thin margin, which he credited to labor.  Nickels subsequently began pushing initiatives in 
cooperation with the KCLC and its affiliates, including promotion of affordable housing, 
cooperation with the immigrant workers’ freedom ride, advocacy of Project Labor Agreements 
and a letter of support for striking grocery store workers.  
As of mid-2005, Seattle’s economy seems, once again, to be booming.  Due to years of 
reforms and the electoral success of the Democrats in 2004, labor now has unprecedented access 
to public officials at the city, county and state levels.  It remains to be seen, however, how unions 
will take advantage of their new channels of insider access at the Port of Seattle, the monorail 
board, the state legislature, and county and city councils.  Furthermore, it is unclear how this new 
power will translate into a region-wide strategy, with the national AFL-CIO – as is currently 
planned – slashing its budget, combining county-sized labor councils into larger area labor 
federations and potentially losing dues from Change to Win affiliates.  Lastly, the political gains 
are hardly a sure thing, even when the infrastructure is in place; labor’s third candidate for the 
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port commission was defeated in the primary in 2005 amid a backlash from the business 
community. 
The biggest limitation of these efforts, however, has been the link to organizing.  Judd 
and Williamson tried to connect their coalition-building work of the KCLC, Worker Center and 
Jobs with Justice to organizing new workers.  In 1997, the national AFL-CIO created the Union 
Cities program, and Seattle found itself a center of the new organizing push.  Leaders identified 
the role of the KCLC in supporting organizing as mobilizing members to support affiliate 
campaigns, as well as research and training.  The KCLC Executive Board hired a full-time Union 
Cities organizer who worked with affiliates to build their capacity to turn out allies and union 
members in support of campaigns.  It also created a multi-union organizing body called Seattle 
Union Now, which lasted a bit over 2 years, but folded amidst inter-union squabbles, around the 
time Judd left.  Despite the many successes, such as the stronger ties to the broader community 
and the improved access to local government, as well as Judd’s personal role in advocating a 
shift of resources to organizing, the CLC and its associated structures never spurred any push 
into the new economy that attracted many members, with the exception of a few specific worker 
groups like graduate students at the University of Washington. 
Seattle’s high-road infrastructure is a case of organized labor coming to terms with the 
local politics associated with the globalization of manufacturing, services and distribution.  The 
KCLC has played a central role by connecting to these substantive issues and thereby winning 
new channels of influence in the region.  In workforce development, unions used the building 
boom to heal their relations with the minority community and innovate in neighborhood 
economic development policy.  In electoral politics, unions have strengthened both membership 
involvement and community cooperation; the successful outcomes have created new channels of 
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insider influence.  These coalition-building efforts are not merely ad-hoc marriages of 
convenience, but are part of an overall growth of organizations and relationships that, because of 
ongoing spillover effects from one project to another, has lasted nearly two decades.  With no 
end in sight to Seattle’s development boom and a string of visible payoffs from coalition work, 
organized labor is positioned to play a role in shaping the city’s future. 
 
Buffalo 
Buffalo is union town facing a much deeper crisis in terms of job loss, social polarization and 
population decline.  Between 1956 and 2000, Buffalo lost 125,000 out of more than 200,000 
manufacturing jobs, including the region’s largest private employer, Bethlehem Steel, which 
employed 20,000 workers at its peak.  The machinists, steel, textile, printing and chemical 
unions were hit especially hard.  With these industries gone, the most important employers are in 
the public sector, health care and several large auto plants.  The largest unions are thus in these 
sectors: AFSCME, AFT, CWA, SEIU, Teamsters and UAW, plus the building trades.   
 In response to failed economic development policies, unions have stepped in and built 
several organizations to fill the vacuum.  Buffalo’s unions have pursued both community 
coalitions and labor-management partnerships to deal with economic decline.  Mobilizing against 
plant closures and cooperating with management to keep plants competitive are the two 
dominant union strategies, at times used simultaneously by the same unions.  The new initiatives 
discussed here emerged, not through the central labor council, but largely as a spillover from 
social movement unionist and labor-management partnership initiatives.   
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 Most of Buffalo’s major unions were organized during the CIO upsurge of the 1930s.  
Before the decade of the Wagner Act and sit-down strikes, Buffalo had a reputation as a non-
union town.  The weakness of AFL unions outside of the skilled trades and transport sectors 
helped attract major employers like Bethlehem Steel, Westinghouse, Ford, and General Motors.  
After a tumultuous period of organizing marked by violent clashes between employers and 
workers (McDonnell 1970), Buffalo became one of the most strongly unionized cities in the 
country.  The 1949 Bell Aircraft strike was a victory of nationwide importance in labor’s drive 
for employer-provided pension benefits, and by the 1970s, Buffalo was also one of the most 
strike-prone cities.  During the 1980s, Buffalo’s union leaders played a leading role in the 
national “Solidarity Day” protests against the Reagan administration.   
Buffalo’s chief problems are deindustrialization and population decline, and neither 
politics nor free enterprise has served Buffalo very well in dealing with them.  The “Queen City 
of the Great Lakes,” once an economic powerhouse and the country’s 10th biggest city, is reeling 
from global competition, shifts of population and jobs to the Sunbelt and state policies that fail to 
stop the hemorrhage.  Since 1970, the Buffalo-Niagara region has lost 200,000 residents and 
since 1950, the city of Buffalo’s population has declined by more than half.  In the public sector, 
a declining tax base has forced the city and county governments to lay off thousands of workers, 
despite a growing need for public services and good jobs.  As the population has dispersed into 
the suburbs, social inequality has deepened.  A racially diverse urban core with high 
unemployment and poverty rates has emerged, as the relatively affluent and overwhelmingly 
white suburbs have grown.  This polarization and decline (Goldman 1983; Taylor 1990) have led 
to a search for public investment from the state and federal governments and a colorful local 
politics of Rockefeller republicanism, tax revolts and economic nationalism. 
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 Union-driven high-road economic development projects have a different flavor in Buffalo 
than in Seattle.  Rather than emerging from a vibrant CLC interested in challenging corporate 
globalization, Buffalo’s projects are driven by a network of pragmatic activists fighting for jobs.  
Job retention has involved contentious campaigns, such as the one in the late 1980s to prevent 
auto parts maker Trico from moving its auto parts assembly jobs to Mexico, a campaign that led 
to the creation of the local Jobs with Justice affiliate.  Nevertheless, Buffalo also played a 
pioneering role in the growth of labor-management cooperation.  The Buffalo Area Labor-
Management Committee, Western New York Employee Involvement Council, and Cornell ILR 
extension have played a role in promoting labor-management partnership locally, especially in 
large local factories.  By the late 1990s, Buffalo had unusually cooperative labor-management 
relations (Fleron, Stanger and Patton, 2000).   
The leaders who have pushed Buffalo’s economic development projects have come out of 
these community and labor-management initiatives.  For example, Kevin Donovan had led a 
union at a local GM-owned forge (UAW Local 646).  After threats of closure, GM sold the 
forge, along with several other axle-related plants to a newly formed company, American Axle 
and Manufacturing.  Donovan worked with local managers to make production more efficient, 
increase local employment and establish a new facility (albeit under a somewhat lower wage 
scheme).  Another key bridge-builder is Richard Lipsitz, Jr., who came from a family of social 
activists.  Involved in anti-war and civil rights activism, he had worked for several local unions, 
including health care workers and Teamsters.  He had helped create a local multi-union initiative 
to provide low-cost health insurance and coordinated an international campaign of the Teamsters 
to fight job losses in the warehousing sector.   
11/7/2006 Seattle and Buffalo Page 16  
Around the same time, the business community announced a new regional marketing 
initiative, known as the Buffalo Niagara Enterprise.  Along with several other labor leaders, 
Lipsitz and Donovan helped to initiate labor’s response, a union-governed economic 
development organization, the Economic Development Group (EDG).  By 2000, the EDG had a 
full-time coordinator, Phil Wilcox (with a utility IBEW local), who proposed a series of projects 
with ambitious goals, big budgets and multi-year timelines.  The projects addressed energy, 
housing, brownfields restoration and workforce development issues, and required several years 
of proposing, planning and coalition building before implementation.  In 2002, the EDG became 
a chartered nonprofit corporation, hired a professional grant-writer as its executive director , and 
by 2004 was successfully launching projects.   
After the formation of EDG, Donovan and Wilcox became involved in a local committee 
to rework the rules of electricity provision in the region.  The New York Power Authority 
(NYPA) had operated a hydroelectric power plant in Niagara Falls for nearly 50 years.  Under 
the terms of a federally issued license, NYPA had been required to provide inexpensive power to 
local industry.  The authority announced its intention to renew its license in a consensual way, in 
order to avoid legal fees, sparking a complex set of negotiations.  As co-chair of the committee, 
Donovan worked to build agreement among a wide range of stakeholders (mainly city and 
county governments, Indian tribes, environmentalists and business and union interests).  At stake 
were maintaining the flow of cheap power to the region’s key employers and distributing 
NYPA’s surplus revenues from the dam (amounting to $500m a year) into community 
development projects and cash-strapped local governments. 
Another of EDG’s projects, District Energy, addresses energy issues through a new 
downtown heating scheme, which aims to reduce costs and pollution, while creating new local 
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jobs.  In April 2001, the city government announced its intention to develop a district energy 
system modeled on a new biomass heat plant in St. Paul, Minnesota and facilities common in 
European cities.  Buffalo’s city council named EDG as the developer of choice for the project.  
Organizers estimated energy cost reductions by as much as 40% for downtown businesses, 
hospitals, government agencies, the public schools and housing projects.   
Under the new scheme, local farmers will produce energy crops to fuel the plant, which 
will pollute less than the current system.  The new facility will create a handful of skilled jobs 
downtown employed by a new nonprofit corporation.  Despite some early difficulties in finding a 
company to provide technical expertise, the project raised $27 million by issuing bonds.  Under 
phase one, involving an existing energy loop downtown, district energy will go online in late 
2005. 
Training has also been on the EDG agenda.  The local building trades unions established 
an urban construction training program under the terms of a PLA for a new billion-dollar state-
funded project of the Buffalo Public Schools.  The PLA mandated contributions from contractors 
on the project into a preapprenticeship program that would bring minority youth into building 
trades’ apprenticeship programs.  After a high-profile start, the complexity of the training project 
proved to be beyond the capability of the building trades.  EDG took over the preapprenticeship 
funding attached to the school PLA and renamed the effort the Buffalo Niagara Jobs Initiative 
(BNJI).  Rather than focusing exclusively on the construction industry, the BNJI works as a 
network, connecting training providers to trainees in minority communities (mainly black and 
Latino), in response to broader labor market demands.  The craft unions provide on-the-job 
training in urban residential housing rehabilitation for trainees who then go on to union 
apprenticeship programs, higher education or residential construction jobs.  The building trades 
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have been pushed by their local community – including other unionists – to change their hiring 
practices and the racial profile of their membership, in order to boost wages in low-income 
communities. 
Through the EDG, unions have their own organization to undertake development projects 
directly.  There is, however, a second aspect of the strategy.  Buffalo’s unions follow a “two-lane 
high road” strategy that includes collaboration with willing progressive employers in the region 
through the Champions Network (Fleron and Applegate, 2004).  The network emerged from the 
2000 report, Champions at Work, and is organized around specific development projects.  The 
staff of the local Cornell ILR office and two recently retired union officials provide 
organizational support to the network, which is directed by a volunteer steering committee of 
labor and management representatives.   
 Organized by the local ILR office, the Champions report presented original survey results 
and case studies on local employers to augment the BNE’s regional marketing activities.  The 
representative survey supported claims that the region’s highly skilled, unionized workforce had 
advantages for potential investors in terms of labor peace and innovative work practices.  The 
report’s fifteen case studies were based on extensive taped and transcribed interviews with 
business owners, human resource managers and union officials undertaken by a team of labor 
and management volunteers under the direction of Cornell ILR researchers (Fleron, Stanger and 
Patton 2000).  The interview process and supplemental research to complete the case studies 
created relationships among the employer, union and university participants, formed the basis of 
the Champions Network.  Funded by the region’s delegation to the state legislature, the report 
was released at a public event attended by civic, business and union leaders.   
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In 2003, Cornell ILR staff revived the Champions Network, conducting separate labor 
and business focus groups to identify common concerns with local economic development 
strategies.  In a subsequent joint meeting, union and business leaders established three areas in 
which they thought they should work together on the region’s challenges.  One focus area, 
headed by an official from the CWA and a manager from a health insurer, concerns economic 
development policy.  They have consulted with heads of the region’s Industrial Development 
Agencies about how to improve economic development incentives.  A second project, chaired by 
a local beverage distributor and the head of the teachers union (NYSUT), promotes voter 
registration and civic involvement, and uses the workplace as a forum to get out the vote and 
focus political attention on the shared needs of companies and workers.  The third arena, on 
“regional image,” is co-chaired by a retired representative from the office and professional 
workers’ union (OPEIU) and a manager from a large telecommunications firm.  They provide 
support for the “Believe in Buffalo Niagara” campaign to collect 100,000 signatures on a letter 
touting the region’s virtues and dynamism.  Once collected, organizers plan to send the letter to 
several hundred consultants and CEOs responsible for investment decisions, and to get 
supporting letters from high-level politicians.  This project has broad support: local unions, 
businesses, schools and civil society organizations (ranging from realtors and the BNE to unions 
and the Coalition for Economic Justice) have donated services and turned out volunteers. 
The Champions Network continues to generate new projects.  It continues to publicize 
examples of high-road job creation and retention through local in-plant partnership and issues an 
annual “Champions @ Work Award.”  The first recipient, in 2004, was the local Ford plant and 
UAW Local 897, whose jointly governed production improvements brought representatives from 
all of Ford’s North American plants to the area for a meeting of the Lean Implementation 
11/7/2006 Seattle and Buffalo Page 20  
Network.  The 2005 prize goes to a local cap manufacturer, New Era Cap, and CWA Local 
14177, which, after a nearly year-long strike and boycott, turned the business around with a 
labor-management partnership that has improved productivity, developed high-value niche 
market products and secured corporate compliance with international labor rights accords.  The 
network’s latest project, an economic development trade show planned for 2007, is driven by the 
regional chapter of the National Electrical Contractors Association and supported by Cornell ILR 
and EDG staff.   
In partnership with Cornell ILR, the network also plays an educational role, teaching the 
business community the value of organized labor and promoting a better understanding of 
mutual concerns.  The resulting change in attitude has led, for example, to BNE officials 
referring prospective investors worried about unionization to union leaders involved in the 
Network.  In February of 2004, Cornell and the Champions Network hosted a “high-road 
economics” conference attended by 160 union, community and business leaders and featuring 
presentations by union leaders from San Jose, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh as well as the CWA’s 
national president, Morton Bahr.  Participants exchanged best practice ideas from around the 
country, prompting further debate and enthusiasm, and strengthening the relationships with 
community organizations beyond labor and management. 
Alongside the dialogue between labor and business leaders, another channel of influence 
has emerged to promote mobilization and social justice.  The Coalition for Economic Justice 
(CEJ) originally formed in the Trico campaign of the late 1980s, and later affiliated with Jobs 
with Justice.  CEJ organizes community support for union struggles, workers rights and 
progressive public policies like the living wage.  Governed by a board of union and religious 
leaders, its young staff connects unions with the region’s broader forces of progressivism.  
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 In recent years, CEJ and its Workers Rights Board (WRB) have supported local and 
national struggles, including several local strikes.  Grievances from local hospitals and from 
national targets Wal-Mart and textile services firm Cintas were aired in the first WRB reception 
in 2004.  They have also assisted in rally turnout, most recently, for city workers, nurses and 
Adelphia workers.  They also supported workers at an Oregon diary farm owned by Buffalo-
based Sorrento Lactalis.  The WRB awarded Sorrento the “Grinch of the Year” award for 
refusing to negotiate with workers.  CEJ also supported New Era Cap strikers in 2001-2, in 
conjunction with a nationwide network of student labor activists, United Students Against 
Sweatshops. 
The CEJ led the living wage campaign by building broad support for the measure and 
getting help from local union activists.  In 1999, the Buffalo city council passed an ordinance 
mandating that government contractors pay a living wage (now $9.03 an hour with health 
insurance or $10.15 without).  Because of fiscal problems, however, the city never enforced the 
ordinance.  CEJ sued the city and, in 2003, won new language to delegate enforcement to a 
Living Wage Commission comprised of representatives from labor, business, religion, 
community organizations and Cornell ILR.  With assistance from University of Buffalo law 
student interns and pro bono attorneys, the commission has won wage increases for over 160 
workers of contractors at city owned parking lots through voluntary compliance agreements with 
employers.  The commission is also reviewing all city contracts for compliance and promoting 
improved contracting procedures within the city administration.   
Unlike the EDG or Champions Network, the CEJ confronts low-road employers in a 
public and visible way.  In the minds of union leaders, the CEJ fits into the overall scheme of 
labor’s local development initiatives, because strike support, living wage enforcement and 
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mobilizations around plant closures also aim to preserve good jobs.  It operates alongside, and in 
cooperation with, other active coalitions in the region, including Champions and other single-
issue coalitions devoted to occupational safety, child care and “economic self-sufficiency.”  In 
addition, it links local activists to national campaigns, such as Wal-Mart, Cintas and Sorrento.  
CEJ is an example of social movement unionism, in the sense that it mobilizes broad community 
support for the struggles of workers and their unions. 
As Buffalo’s problems persist, union capacities to address them are growing.  Although 
the population and some of the key manufacturing industries have stabilized in the region as a 
whole, suburbanization and public sector retrenchment continue.  Cuts to city and local 
government services are especially painful, since they eliminate thousands of middle-income 
jobs and make it difficult for local government to address persistent social needs.  At the same 
time, the CLC leadership, which until 2005 was not deeply involved in coalition work, has 
changed.  The new leader, unlike the former one, has been involved both in EDG and the 
Champions Network, and has begun to give the CLC a more active role in carrying out local 
coalition work. 
Buffalo’s high road infrastructure is a case of unions coming to terms with the policy 
concerns associated with the globalization of manufacturing and the decline of a region.  Despite 
differences in the problems unions face and the key actors building community partnership, 
Buffalo’s unionists, like those in Seattle, have found ways to institutionalize their partnerships 
with the broader community.  Champions, EDG and CEJ are three faces of this development, 
organizing regional partnerships, development projects and contentious mobilization.  While 
social movement unionism may seem inconsistent with labor-management partnership, the same 
individuals push both approaches.  As Buffalo’s chronic job crisis deepens and moves to the 
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public sector, support within the local labor movement for the high road infrastructure grows.  
Labor’s coalition work continues to spill over into ever more ambitious initiatives. 
 
High Road Social Infrastructures 
Although Seattle and Buffalo have different industrial structures, face different policy 
challenges and have different labor histories, unions in both have built a high-road social 
infrastructure.  We have depicted two paths to the high road: Seattle’s, where unions work to 
redistribute the gains of vigorous economic growth, and Buffalo’s, where they seek new 
solutions where economic development policy has proven ineffective.  In Seattle, unions have 
used economic growth as a lever for addressing problems of inequality, unstable work relations 
and threats to manufacturing jobs.  Buffalo’s unions, by contrast, have built local political will to 
reverse the course of economic decline.    
Differences in local politics matter.  Seattle’s unions have participated in a progressive 
local political scene and developed a strategic relationship with local Democratic politicians.  
Buffalo’s unions, by contrast, have worked, not only with Democrats and community groups, but 
also with the local business establishment and moderate Republicans.  While progressive 
elements in local government, like the mayor’s office, have been central to high-road 
policymaking in Seattle, Buffalo’s financially bankrupt city and county governments have 
played, with few exceptions, a passive role.   
Nevertheless, these infrastructures have much in common.  Unions set up a series of 
organizations to design policies, administer programs, seek funding, lobby, mobilize and 
maintain relations with partners.  The infrastructures grow from project to project, and each 
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project sets up relationships and raises issues that can lead to more coalition work.  In both cities, 
the policies involve integrating minority workers into middle-income construction jobs in the 
name of connecting building to a more egalitarian form of economic development.  Labor faces 
the same kinds of opponents in both cities – anti-union contractors’ associations opposed to the 
building trades’ market stabilization efforts, organized companies where strikes occur, and non-
union companies where organizing drives take place.  While these businesses take on the unions 
as opponents, others ally themselves with unions.  Unionized contractors implementing new 
workforce development programs (and winning contracts in the process) and the broad labor-
management partnership sponsored by the Champions Network are two examples.  Individual 
union leaders play a key role in both cases by finding partners and cementing cooperation by 
setting up new organizations with staff. 
Organizing of new workers remains missing from the form of union revitalization 
discussed here, even if being “part of the solution” improves unions’ chances of winning the 
hearts and minds of unorganized workers.  While Seattle is home to many organizing unions, the 
KCLC has managed to support, though not to initiate organizing drives.  During the 1990s, the 
KCLC’s attempt to create a more pro-active multi-union approach to expanding organizing 
efforts failed.  Similarly, in Buffalo, organizing unions exist.  At the EDG, however, the link to 
organizing is absent even in theory, and CEJ activists bemoan the lack of requests to support new 
organizing.  In practice, the infrastructure cannot support organizing if (1) local unions are not 
organizing new workers, (2) local unions do not approach these organizations for help, or (3) 
local unions as a whole do not reach a consensus that it makes sense for the infrastructure to 
support organizing more directly.  These, at least, are the obstacles in Seattle and Buffalo. 
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High road economic development strategies have emerged in an AFL town on the Pacific 
Rim and a CIO town on the Great Lakes.  They amount not merely to single initiatives, but two 
infrastructures that have supported a series of initiatives over a decade or more.  Along with 
weight of evidence in this volume, these two case studies suggest that community-minded unions 
can build these structures in a wide range of urban environments, and that, with political will and 
organizational skills, urban labor movements can learn from one another.  
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